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file 3.1

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

Director, IC Staff

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

22 June 1983

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

DDCI

no copy

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23¹⁵ JUL 1983

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FORM 1-79

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USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

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ICS-83-0807
22 JUN 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM:
Director, Intelligence Community Staff

SUBJECT: Sources and Methods Speech

1. In response to request, the Chairman of the Security Committee has reviewed your speech on unauthorized disclosures of information on intelligence sources and methods and has formulated two proposals for further dissemination of your message.

2. The first proposal is to have your delivery of the speech video-taped. In order to avoid the "talking head" problem, the video could include graphic presentations of newspaper clippings, maps depicting world trouble spots, rocket launches, copies of the NID (with the notation to make a copy), NSDD-84, and short clips from the recent SECOM-produced videotape for security orientation of senior officials. The tapes could be disseminated to NFIB principals with a request to have them shown to all personnel approved for access to sensitive intelligence. CIA could arrange showings for non-NFIB agencies.

3. The alternative proposal, which would have the advantage of a live presentation, but would lack your personal touch, would be to modify the script for presentation by senior security officers such as the Director of Security CIA and the Chairman, SECOM. The use of visual aids as suggested above might be considered. Arrangements for presentations could be made through the members of SECOM for their respective agencies.

4. If you find either of these approaches attractive, SECOM is prepared to assist in executing whichever one you choose.

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SUBJECT: Sources and Methods Speech

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee

1 - DDCI

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20 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Director of Security

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Sources and Methods Speech

1. My talk with the Armed Forces Policy Council today was received with considerable interest and concern. Cap tasked them to make recommendations to him for follow-up actions to be taken in DoD. He expressed particular concern about how the alleged contingency plans for blockade and other military steps got into The Washington Post this morning.

2. There were a few questions on which I would like some work done:

a. What do other countries do to deal with the problems which I laid out? I said that in some countries they cut your hands off and went on to describe the British response to the Prime disclosures. We should have a fuller response to this, including particularly what we know about German, French and Japanese security practices.


b. There were considerable questions about our dissemination practices. Do all the people who receive the NID really need it? Even though it is more costly, should we not consider doing more briefing in oral form and less in written form? One thought which came to me is whether we shouldn't specialize the NID a little more--why do diplomatic and economic officials need to receive information about Soviet weapons tests? Should we consider developing a few categories of separate packages and thereby reduce the number of people who receive the full cross-section of information which the NID makes available?

c. The ease of xeroxing was a matter of particular concern. I didn't say anything, but it revived in my mind the possibility of making the source of copies being found in circulation identifiable. How sure are we that this can be accomplished, when it could become operational, and how early should we make its availability known for deterrent value?

25X1 3. One cogent comment which [] made is the way the military advertises cases of drug abuse to deter others and the way the government keeps quiet about the "white collar crime" of mishandling intelligence. Considerable outrage was expressed about this.


William J. Casey

Attachment



20 June 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
 Executive Director
 Deputy Director for Intelligence
 Deputy Director for Administration
 Deputy Director for Operations
 Deputy Director for Science & Technology
 Director of External Affairs

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting Today at 4:30 re Sources & Methods Protection

1. I have asked for a meeting at 4:30 today to talk about two things:

a. A review of the pros and cons and methods of sanitizing and making the intelligence product more widely available for public diplomacy and general public education purposes. PFIAB is taking a look at this and Bob Gates has done some preparatory work.

b. How we might follow up to press a revitalized effort to strengthen sources and methods protection. I attach notes from a presentation I made to the Armed Services Policy Council this morning and which I will make to the White House, State and NSC staffs during the week. Also attached is a memo on the reaction of the Pentagon today.

2. Subsequent to dictation of that memo, I had a call from Henry Catto, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, asking for a briefing for his entire public affairs staff and raising a question as to whether it would be desirable to provide some kind of a briefing on the importance of this subject and the stakes of the problems involved to the Pentagon press corps. In that connection, [redacted] has an opportunity to talk to a press group shortly, in which he might take a shot at this.

3. To help in your deliberations, I also attach a talk which I made to a group of journalists at the Georgetown Institute of Foreign Service.


 William J. Casey

Attachments



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SOURCES AND METHODS SPEECH

I ASKED TO TALK TO YOU TODAY ABOUT A NIAGARA OF LOOSE TALK WHICH IS LITERALLY DESTROYING OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSETS, UNDERCUTTING OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES AND IMPAIRING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. MY STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS REQUIRES ME TO ACT TO WHATEVER DEGREE I CAN ON A CLEAR AND ACCELERATING BREAKDOWN IN CONGRESSIONAL AND MEDIA RESPONSIBILITY AND IN DISCIPLINE IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. I NEED YOUR UNDERSTANDING, YOUR COOPERATION AND YOUR ADVICE ON WHAT WE CAN DO TO RESTORE THIS RESPONSIBILITY AND DISCIPLINE.

THE COST OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE AND MISHANDLING OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE IS APPALLING IN OUR RELATIONS WITH OTHER NATIONS, IN THEIR LOSS OF CONFIDENCE IN OUR RELIABILITY, AND IN THE ABILITY TO DEAL ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS. WE HAVE LOST INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN BUILT AT ENORMOUS COST IN DOLLARS AND IN THE RISK OF LIFE AND REPUTATION. IT HAS DEPRIVED US OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION WHICH MAY AT SOME FUTURE DATE BE CRITICAL TO OUR SECURITY AND, INDEED, CAN COST HEAVILY IN LIVES AND TREASURE ANY DAY. UNAUTHORIZED AND IMPRUDENT DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS CAUSED OTHER NATIONS TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES, TO CONSIDER TERMINATION OF PROJECTS IN WHICH THEY ARE JOINTLY ENGAGED WITH US, TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION THEY HAVE PREVIOUSLY GIVEN US AND TAKE OTHER STEPS DAMAGING TO OUR INTERESTS. I WILL JUST TICK OFF A FEW

BY THE CONFIRMATION...

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I AM HERE

TODAY TO SOLICIT YOUR COOPERATION NOT ONLY IN TIGHTENING UP AND EDUCATING OTHERS TO THE PROBLEM WE HAVE, BUT IN SENDING A SIGNAL THAT WE MEAN BUSINESS. THIS IS SOMETHING IN WHICH WE HAVE A STRONG MUTUAL INTEREST. WHEN AN INTELLIGENCE SOURCE IS LOST OR DAMAGED, ALL OF US LOSE VALUABLE INFORMATION, AN APPARATUS WHICH HAS TAKEN MANY YEARS AND MANY BILLIONS TO CREATE IS DESTROYED BIT BY BIT, ADDITIONAL BILLIONS ARE REQUIRED TO REPLACE LOST SOURCES. SOMETIMES THE LOSS IS MORE THAN MONEY. OUR HUMAN SOURCES ARE SUBJECT TO DEATH, IMPRISONMENT, OR RUINATION OF CAREERS. THE CONSEQUENCES TO THEIR FAMILIES MAY BE TRAGIC AS WELL.

LET ME NOW ADDRESS SPECIFIC STEPS THAT WE CAN TAKE TO PROTECT SOURCES AND METHODS--SOME WITHIN MY PROVINCE AND OTHERS WITHIN YOURS....

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WITHIN YOURS. THERE ARE RULES ABOUT THE HANDLING OF SECRET MATERIAL. PEOPLE WHO RECEIVE THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY, CALLED THE NID, ARE REQUIRED TO RETURN IT THE SAME DAY, NOT TO PERMIT PERSONS OTHER THAN THE RECIPIENT TO READ IT, AND NOT TO MAKE COPIES.

I LOOKED INTO HOW THE RULES

FOR HANDLING THE NID WERE BEING ADHERED TO. I FOUND THAT OUR RECORDS SHOW THAT MANY PEOPLE HAVE NOT RETURNED COPIES OF THE NID AS REQUIRED AND THAT SOME OF THE RETURNED COPIES INDICATED THAT THE DOCUMENT HAD BEEN TAKEN APART. A FEW EVEN HAD A NOTATION, "MAKE A COPY," ON THE COVER. EVERY RECIPIENT OF THE NID HAS BEEN ASKED TO REPORT TO US ON THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED IN HIS OFFICE TO ASSURE THAT THE NID IS READ ONLY BY THE AUTHORIZED RECIPIENT, IS NOT COPIED AND IS RETURNED AS REQUIRED. THOSE WHO DO NOT COMPLY WILL NO LONGER RECEIVE THE NID. WE WILL ASK QUESTIONS WHENEVER RETURNED COPIES APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN TAMPERED WITH IN A WAY WHICH SUGGESTS COPYING. THIS TIGHTENING UP WILL BE CARRIED TO OTHER INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS.

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I AM ASKING POLICY AND INFORMATION

OFFICIALS TO NOTIFY THE CIA OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AS SOON AS THEY GET WIND OF AN IMMINENT MEDIA REPORT WHICH CAN COMPROMISE SOURCES AND METHODS. I OR MY DEPUTY WILL BE ALERTED AND WILL IMMEDIATELY CALL THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL AT THE RELEVANT MEDIA INSTITUTION TO PERSUADE HIM TO WITHHOLD PUBLICATION OR MODIFY THE LANGUAGE AS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE SOURCE. THIS WILL NOT ALWAYS WORK, BUT I HAVE HAD SUCCESS IN THIS WITH MAJOR MEDIA ON SEVERAL IMPORTANT STORIES, AND I HAVE EXPLORED THE ISSUE WITH ENOUGH MEDIA OFFICIALS TO BELIEVE THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO EDUCATE THEM TO BE CONSISTENTLY RECEPTIVE TO PLEAS FOR SOURCE PROTECTION IF WE ORGANIZE OURSELVES TO ACT PROMPTLY AND EFFECTIVELY.

FOR TOO LONG UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE HAS BEEN A RISK-FREE ACTIVITY. THERE IS THE BELIEF THAT NO ONE IS EVER PENALIZED FOR HANDING OUT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR FOR CARELESS HANDLING OF THAT INFORMATION. THAT IS BEING CHANGED. WITHIN THE LAST FEW WEEKS A SENIOR OFFICIAL HAS BEEN ASKED TO RESIGN AFTER HE ADMITTED HANDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OVER TO A REPORTER. INCIDENTALLY, WHEN HIS ASSISTANT APPLIED FOR EMPLOYMENT AT THE CIA, THE POLYGRAPH ELICITED A CONFIRMATION. ANOTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL HAS BEEN CUT OFF FROM SECRET INTELLIGENCE FOR VIOLATING A SPECIFIC WARNING WITH RESPECT TO HOW SPECIFIC INFORMATION HAD TO BE HANDLED IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE SOURCE. I WILL NOT HESITATE TO DO THIS WHENEVER I HAVE THE AUTHORITY AND ABILITY TO DO SO.

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NSSD-84 CALLS UPON EACH DEPARTMENT TO ESTABLISH RULES FOR CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS. I'LL TELL YOU ABOUT THE RULES WE HAVE AT THE CIA. NOBODY EXCEPT THE DIRECTOR AND DEPUTY DIRECTOR IS AUTHORIZED TO SPEAK TO THE PRESS WITHOUT SECURING EXPLICIT PERMISSION. ALL SUCH CONVERSATIONS ARE TO BE ATTENDED BY A MEMBER OF OUR OFFICE OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS. CONTACTS WITH THE PRESS ARE REPORTED AND THE SUBSTANTIVE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATION KEPT ON FILE. FINALLY, PERHAPS AS MUCH DAMAGE IS CAUSED BY EXPLAINING AND THEREBY DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONFIRMING A PUBLICATION OR EVEN A PROPOSED STORY AS BY THE LEAK WHICH ORIGINALLY GAVE RISE TO THE STORY. WE ALL NEED TO BE SMARTER IN DEALING WITH THE PRESS. A FAVORITE PRESS TACTIC IS TO ASK YOU TO CONFIRM OR DENY A SPECIFIC FRAGMENT OF INFORMATION OR SIMPLY TO TELL THE REPORTER WHETHER A STORY IS WAY OFF BASE. EVERY ONE OF US SHOULD BY NOW BE SMART ENOUGH TO KNOW THAT HE IS NOT THE ONLY SOURCE AND THAT THE REPORTER GOES ABOUT HIS BUSINESS MUCH IN THE WAY WE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DO--COLLECTING SNIPPETS OF INFORMATION FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES AND THEN PIECING TOGETHER A MOsaic. CONFIRMING STORIES THAT ALREADY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, CONFIRMING ELEMENTS OF STORIES OR REACTING TO A REPORTER'S INQUIRY ABOUT A PARTICULAR PIECE OF INFORMATION CAN BE AS DAMAGING AS LEAKING THE INFORMATION YOURSELF. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WILL TRY TO LEAD YOU TO BELIEVE THEY KNOW MORE THAN THEY ACTUALLY DO. IF YOU DISCUSS A SUBJECT THEY SEEM TO ALREADY KNOW ABOUT, YOU MAY CONFIRM WHAT PREVIOUSLY WAS JUST A GUESS, OR PROVIDE THE ADDITIONAL DATA TO MAKE A GOOD STORY OUT OF ONE THAT MIGHT NOT

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HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED. THAT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR ACTIVITY HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT DOES NOT RELEASE US OF THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DISCUSS IT.

ONE SIMPLE RULE AUTOMATICALLY AVOIDS A LOT OF TROUBLE AND I BEG EACH OF YOU TO ADHERE TO IT RIGIDLY. IF YOU ARE QUERIED ABOUT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OR ANY INTELLIGENCE MATTER, SIMPLY SAY, AS THE PRESIDENT DOES, "WE DON'T TALK ABOUT SUCH MATTERS." THAT'S BETTER THAN "NO COMMENT" WHICH IS SOMETIMES TAKEN AS CONFIRMATION.

THERE ARE FURTHER STEPS TO BE CONSIDERED. A BILL TO ESTABLISH CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HAS BEEN CLEARED BY OMB. NSSD-84 APPROVES THE USE OF THE POLYGRAPH IN INVESTIGATIONS OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES. AT THE CIA AND NSA, EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THE POLYGRAPH IS A POWERFUL TOOL IN DETERRING VIOLATIONS OF SECURITY AND OTHER RULES. OVER THE LAST YEAR, 41 RESIGNATIONS AT CIA HAVE RESULTED NOT BY VERDICT OF THE POLYGRAPH BUT FROM QUESTIONS AND ADMISSIONS WHICH RESULTED FROM GUIDANCE PROVIDED BY THE POLYGRAPH. OF THESE, THE LARGEST NUMBER, 13 RESIGNATIONS, HAVE BEEN OCCASIONED BY SECURITY BREACHES, OTHERS WERE FOR THEFT, PADDING ACCOUNTS, FRAUD AND OTHER FRAUDS AND VIOLATIONS. AS A RESULT OF A SINGLE SERIOUS SECURITY LEAK, THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT HAS JUST RECENTLY FOR THE FIRST TIME AUTHORIZED USE OF THE POLYGRAPH FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF INQUIRING INTO SECURITY BREACHES.

SECRET

IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS, ONLY LEADERSHIP AND EXAMPLE WILL TURN A TIDE THAT IS RUNNING AGAINST US AND CAN SWAMP US IF WE DON'T REVERSE IT. IT'S UP TO US TO IMPRESS ON THOSE WITH WHOM WE WORK THAT "LOOSE LIPS SINK SHIPS" AND SHOW THAT THOSE WHO TAKE IT UPON THEMSELVES TO DECIDE WHEN THE SYSTEM CAN BE IGNORED PLACE BOTH OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND THEMSELVES IN JEOPARDY. THE SECURITY COMPONENTS OF DIA AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STAND READY TO HELP YOU EDUCATE YOUR PEOPLE AND OTHERWISE PROVIDE GUIDANCE ON THE PROPER USE AND HANDLING OF INTELLIGENCE. I'D LIKE ANY SUGGESTIONS OR QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

DCI PRESENTATION"LEAKS - POSITIVE STEPS TO BE TAKEN"

Everyone recognizes that the problem of leaks - the unauthorized release of classified information to the media - is neither new nor unique to this administration. Yet leaks in recent years have created unusually serious problems in the Intelligence Community and show all of us that we cannot stand idly by and let intelligence operations and national policy efforts fall victim to eroding government discipline and the wiley tactics of the media. We must fight back and take appropriate counteractions. This presentation addresses that need, as I see it, consonant with my responsibilities to protect intelligence sources and methods.

It is clear that some media representatives feel that they have government secrecy and security on the run and they seem emboldened to press their advantage. By invariably linking government secrecy to coverups for alleged corruption, alleged wrongdoing or alleged inefficiency, these media persons have created an atmosphere of frustration, confusion and resignation in the government sector and with the American public. By cleverly and invariably showing the leaker to be indistinguishable from the vaguely heroic "whistle blower," the same reporters have been able to obscure the self-serving and usually squalid motives of the typical leaker.

Unless there is prompt and effective counteraction, government security programming and personnel security discipline

may be irreversibly damaged. The consequences of this would be enormous and ^{tragic} unacceptable. While I believe there is a breakdown in media responsibility and in discipline in the Executive Branch, by moving quickly and resolutely now, we can turn this around.

^{While} Although deploring their apparent disregard for national security concerns, I must admit a certain grudging respect for the investigative and interrogative skills of certain reporters who have operated recently against our best interests. It is clear that these reporters have built their stories piecemeal and with considerable patience. Starting with a few questionably acquired facts, they have cleverly gone to second-level sources and convinced the latter that since the story was out anyway, verification would not be harmful. Thus these writers were able to prove to their satisfaction and, unfortunately, the satisfaction of their readers, that the story was probably true. I am convinced that some of the second-level sources involved in these incidents were significantly high-level officers whose normal ~~business~~ acumen and professional sophistication would appear incongruous ^{with} to their naivete in these interactions with the media.

Not ^a one of them would ever consider handing over information about intelligence sources and methods to a foreign intelligence officer. Yet time and again they have shared this same information with media representatives who have published it, indirectly causing the very same damage to our national security. Indeed, I am sad to say the skill of the reporter all

too often tends to ^{exceed} ^{discretion} the response capability of the official and the extraction of classified information is quite painless.

We are all familiar with the methodology. It is a wonder that it continues to work.

°For example, a reporter says that he is going ahead with a story and just wants to check its accuracy or avoid misstating the administration's position. Government officials, in setting the record straight, confirm sensitive information which may have been nothing more than a reporter's guess in the first place.

°For example, a reporter will call individual after individual, getting a fact here and another fact there and, as he plays back the information, each succeeding interviewee will provide a fuller and more apparently factual account until a senior official may feel that further restraint is fruitless. He then, throwing caution to the wind, provides a complete, accurate and confirmed piece for tomorrow's headline story.

°Or as happened so recently, a reporter will call a senior staff official about a story which has already appeared in the press and seek comment. The official's comment, while putting a gloss on some side issue, will in

effect provide senior level administration confirmation of intelligence data which yesterday could only be regarded as press speculation.

What I believe has happened has been a confusion of roles and responsibilities on the part of government officials at the same time that there has been a change in the norms and mores of the investigative reporter. A generation ago, if a reporter stumbled across some sensitive information, he probably would not publish it. This clubby, gentlemanly relationship between government and the press, if it ever really existed, has long since eroded in the wake of Viet Nam and Watergate.

A generation ago, government officials would not have felt compelled to respond to press inquiries about classified matters.

The investigative journalist sees his job has ferreting out information and publishing it. The government, if not exactly the enemy, is certainly not part of the reporter's constituency. His role is to inform the public and whatever he can wheedle or weasel out of the Government official is fair game for his daily column or the national air waves. The reporter himself would argue that it is the government's job, your job not his, to safeguard classified information, to protect intelligence sources and methods, and to prevent damage to the national security.

Some reporters, to be sure, have internalized a value system which will keep them from publishing what they understand to be particularly sensitive or damaging information. But many do not want to make such judgments or are not equipped to make these

THIS IS
the
problem!

* That they do so today is probably due ~~to~~ ^{to allowing} concern for personal feelings & immorality

judgments. Indeed, even the most "responsible" journalist will be hostage to the sensibilities of his less restrained colleagues and, if a story is about to break, he will view the classified information in his possession as fair game.

We must clearly understand, and make no mistake about this, it is not the responsibility of the press to abstain from publishing classified information nor can they be expected to show such restraint. It is our responsibility to protect what must be protected.

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Confirmation, especially by senior executive branch officials, can be as damaging as the original leak itself and serves to complicate any contemplated prosecution or other legal action. Confirmation may be construed as declassification or as

evidence that the information really was not classified to begin with. Defense counsel can argue that the administration was not concerned about the information and that little or no damage was involved. In any event, the apparently casual confirmation of very sensitive intelligence information which has leaked serves to trivialize the whole matter.

As members of the White House and National Security Council staffs you are the beneficiaries of a vast and valuable intelligence collection and reporting service. Its major purpose is to serve you, to inform you and to assist you in your deliberations. The taxpayer pays highly so that you can be kept informed. The dedicated men and women who comprise the Intelligence Community work very hard and sometimes at considerable risk to bring you this information.

You also must remember that intelligence constitutes a very fragile system. A thoughtless comment, an indiscreet or ill-considered response can, in ^athe twinkling, undo intelligence methods which have cost millions to put in place and jeopardize sources which have taken years to recruit. The other side gets wind of what we can collect or how we do the collection and countermeasures are taken. Restoring what we had, not advancing the cause or serving you better, but just restoring what we had, can take years and can cost additional millions in scarce resources.

Unauthorized disclosure of classified information, particularly information which reveals intelligence sources or


intelligence methods, is not only bad business and bad policy, it is also illegal.

°It violates the National Security Act of 1947 which mandates the protection of the identities of certain U.S. under-cover intelligence officers, agents, informants and sources and makes their exposure a crime;

°It violates the U.S. Criminal Code which makes it a crime to disclose communications intelligence activities;

°It may violate the law which criminalizes disclosure of national defense information to unauthorized parties;

°It violates the President's Executive Order on national security information; and finally,

°I believe it violates your very oath of office and ill-serves the country and the administration for which you work. 

The recent and serious leaks coming in the wake of a major Presidential initiative to better safeguard national security information -- NSDD 84 -- is particularly unfortunate and disturbing. I hope it strengthens our resolve to work quickly to implement the Directive.

Let me remind you of the key steps which remain to be taken:

°All persons are to be required to sign a nondisclosure agreement as a condition of access to classified information;

°All persons given access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) are to sign a nondisclosure agreement which provides for prepublication review to assure deletion of SCI and other classified information;

°All agencies are to report and investigate unauthorized disclosures of classified information;

°The FBI is to investigate unauthorized disclosures of classified information even when administrative sanctions rather than criminal prosecution may be sought;

°Action is to be taken to revise regulations and policies so that employees may be required to submit to polygraph examinations when necessary in the course of investigations of unauthorized disclosures of classified information;

°Persons who have knowingly disclosed classified information or who have refused to cooperate with investigations of unauthorized disclosures are to be denied

further access to classified information and subjected to other administrative sanctions as appropriate; and finally,

°Appropriate policies are to be adopted to govern contacts between media representatives and government personnel so as to reduce the opportunity for negligent or deliberate disclosure of classified information.

I would hope that implementation of these steps would receive highest priority attention; we can ill-afford further delay.

In an effort to assist in this implementation, particularly with regard to contacts with media representatives, I want to describe to you a new service and system I am instituting within the entire Intelligence Community to better protect intelligence sources and methods. The details of this new service are being communicated, even as I speak to you, to all senior public affairs officers in the Community. The service will take the form of an "Intelligence Verification Hotline" located within CIA that will be covered 24 hours a day, every day of the year.

As I see it, this hotline service will have three important applications to persons in your positions:

°If you get a call from a reporter on a story apparently involving intelligence, intelligence sources or intelligence

methods, before you make a response, I would urge you to call the hotline. Let the Agency assist you in framing a response which will meet your needs and protect our equities as well.

°If a reporter is obviously on the prowl on a matter of intelligence, intelligence sources or intelligence methods, I would urge you to call the hotline. This would give us a chance to alert other possible targets of the same reporter or other reporters on the same story.

°If you are called by a reporter and you learn of an imminent media report likely to compromise a source or method of intelligence, I would urge you to call the hotline and you will get from us a prompt response. This response may take the form of a personalized effort by me or by my deputy, John McMahon, to promptly contact the appropriate person at the relevant media institution where we will attempt to persuade that person to withhold publication or to modify the story's language as necessary to protect the source or method.

My intervention or John McMahon's intervention in cases such as this will not always work but I have had some success with this in the past. Furthermore, I have explored the issue with enough media officials to be hopeful we can educate some of them to be receptive to pleas for source protection. This will only

happen, however, if we organize ourselves to act promptly and effectively.

I am calling for your help on this day on the matter of leaks in the belief that by your leadership, by your personal discipline, by your commitment and by your example, you can set a tone for media relations within the Executive Branch that will be positive and yet be properly secure.